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Globalisation is the latest stage in the permanent process of social change that started 
as industrialisation and modernisation in Europe but now is spreading globally. The paper 
analyzes different globalisation theories and how the recent wave of globalisation (in the last 
30 years) is related to historical events that caused change in economy, ideology and technol­
ogy.
Globalisation is defined as the process of converting separate national economies into 
an integrated world economy; in the social sphere as intensifying social relations on distance 
and in the political sphere as a loss of power and authority of nation-states. Starting with that 
definition the main part of the paper is devoted to analysing economic, social and political in­
dicators, and the consequences of globalisation. As a term and ongoing process globalisation 
becomes widely recognised, and people with usually very different ideological views begin to 
foim a new “strange” alliance against globalisation.
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Globalisation as a process
Globalisation is the latest stage in the permanent process of social change. The term it­
self started to be used extensively 20 to 25 years ago to explain a recent wave of change in the 
economy, in technology, and in society (meaning change in institutions, norms, values and 
culture). Most authors agree that globalisation is nothing new. It is an old process which be­
gan 100 or more years ago (Hirsh, Thompson, 1999); in fact, from the time when social 
change swept Europe in the late 18 century.
From the time capitalism and industrialisation became the main social forces that shape 
societies, one of the main characteristics of modern time is the exponential speed of social 
change. Traditional societies, including feudal societies, were characterised by a very slow 
process of change, where generations lived in basically unchanged conditions. The speed of 
change is becoming faster and faster, and today we can expect major changes to happen, not 
only from one generation to the next, but also within a generation. This speed of change has 
profound consequences on the individual’s life. In traditional society, for example, an occu­
pation was transferred from one generation to the next within the family, as today we can ex­
pect that the individual would change several occupations during his/her career.
If we look back at the social sciences and try to analyse how scholars have described 
that process, we can see that in different periods, different concepts were used in characteris­
ing the processes of social change. Industrialisation, modernisations, post-industrialism and 
post-modernism were, or still are, the main catchwords, as globalisation is today. We cannot 
exclude that the use of concepts in social sciences is also succumbing to the trends of fashion 
(social scientists as humans are not less susceptible to fashion than other more “ordinary” 
people). The use of new concepts largely reflects the transparency of the dominant forces and 
processes that are shaping society.
Industrialisation was the first concept used by social scientists to describe the wide 
transformation of society during which manufacturing and industrial activity became primary 
forms of social production. This change was so deep that the term industrial revolution was
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used to describe not only the transfer from agricultured into industrial production, but also 
the structural changes that were much wider. The consequences were the tremendous in­
crease in productivity, and a wide area of changes in occupational structures, work organisa­
tion, occupational skills, consumption patterns and culture in general.
The concept of modernisation is used to describe this broader spectrum of changes in 
which society becomes more complex, urbanised and differentiated, and in which production 
and social organisation is increasingly based on science. In the social sciences, the concept of 
modernisation was especially used to describe the process through which the “third world 
countries”, the “laggards” in the industrialisation process, became industrialised and mod­
ernised (Inkeles, Smith, 1974). Here we immediately see the elements of globalisation pres­
ent in the process of industrialisation from the beginning. The fact that we had the process of 
gradual industrial-modernisation of the “non-modern” countries from the beginning of the 
industrialisation process (which started in England and than spread gradually around the 
world) indicated that industrialisation and modernisation were “global processes” from the 
start.
The concept of post-industrial society was initially developed by Daniel Bell in the six­
ties. The term indicated that the most developed societies, after industrialisation and mod­
ernisation, were moving into the next stage of development. This next stage is characterised 
by the change in basic production structure from industry to the tertiary sector. The main 
empirical indicator used by Bell for the transition from one stage to another is the employ­
ment structure. When the employment in the “services” sector outnumbered employment in 
industry, the country is entering the “post-industrial” stage. In such a system, knowledge is 
replacing capital, innovation is replacing tradition and ideas are replacing manual work as 
the main source of power and growth. Again, although it was implicit that post-industrialis- 
ation is universal (global) in its development, this was not emphasised in the analytical 
scheme. The main concern was with the internal changes occurring within most developed 
societies, with new technologies, new industries, new occupational structures, information 
technologies, changes in organisational powers etc.
We can conclude that in the processes of industrialisation and modernisation the 
globalisation tendencies were inherently present. Conceptually, we cannot equate industrial­
isation and modernisation with the modern globalisation concept. The reason for this is that 
the industrialisation and modernisation can develop in the isolated social system, for exam­
ple in one nation-state or in some part of the world, globalisation is a process of industrialis­
ation and modernisation, which must not be consider in isolation, but as a global phenome­
non.
Theories of globalisation
There are many theories and definitions of globalisation stressing different forces or 
consequences of globalisation. Spencer (1820-1903) and Saint-Simon (1760-1825) argued 
that economic forces through the action of competitive behavior will eventually equalise unit 
costs of production around the world.
Karl Marx (1818-1883) in his analysis also predicted that “globalisation” (of course at 
the time he did not use the word) would result as the consequences of the inherent forces 
(profit driven motivation) moving capitalist production. The capital is pushed by its inherent 
logic to expansion into the “non-capitalist” economies and societies in order to arrest the 
tendency of falling profits because of the rise of the “organic composition of capital”. It is, in 
other words, forced to move into the spheres were the organic compositions of capital are 
lower and consequently the rates of profits are higher. This also allows the higher profit rates 
in the centre, keeping the “reserve army of labour” and exploits the natural resources around
166
Šporer, Ž.: Controversies of Globalisation Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXI. (2000), No 3-4: 165-181
the world to “the wheels of’ the endless economic expansion. On this basic assumption, the 
theory of “imperialism” was born which is an early Marxist version of globalisation. The cul­
mination of this theory (not in theoretical sophistication but in its popular appeal) was Le­
nin’s “Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism”, where he claimed to prove the inter­
connection of monopolisation tendencies, international capital expansion and military con­
flicts that would take control over the world. The colonial policy of the capitalists' states and 
the capitalist “mode of production” would engulf the whole world. Isn't that one definition of 
globalisation? We can argue that the processes of industrialisation and modernisation inher­
ently pushed toward globalisation. The concept of globalisation was not spelt out, but the 
processes and its analysis were nevertheless present. Among the first “globalisation” theories 
was probably that of the Marxist theory of imperialism; so Buharin and Lenin, among others 
could be called the first “globalisation” theorists.
This also indicates the deep ideological division, which characterise the approach of so­
cial sciences in analysing social processes on the world scale. On one hand the modernisation 
theories was analysing the underdeveloped societies and concentrated on the “obstacles” 
which prevent these societies from “catching up” with the developed world. On the other 
hand the theories of imperialism are deeply suspicious of the industrialisation and moderni­
sation processes and sees the globalisation as inherently exploitative.
In its modern version, the “dependency” theory states that capitalist development 
“skews” the economic structures of the world in such way that the peripheral economies be­
come dependent in their development up on the already developed economies. This depend­
ency means that development is optimised in the function of the developed “central” (West­
ern) economies and not attuned to the need of the “periphery”. The consequences of such 
dependent development are the displacement of existing political-economic structures, but 
not in the “neutral” terms of fostering development, as viewed by classical modernisation 
theories. The displacement of the traditional economy served the needs of the dominant 
countries. The old political structure is replaced with a new political elite dependent on for­
eign support. This new elite is also dependent on Westernised consumption patterns and on 
its source of income from the foreign centres.
The “convergence” theories were developed as reflection of the fact that the capitalist 
economies became more and more “planned”. This trend toward planning of the capitalist 
economies was extrapolated into the future (based on the broad historical generalisations of 
Max Weber, Karl Mannheim and Joseph Schumpeter and the practical theories of J. M. 
Keynes) and it envisioned capitalism becoming more and more regulated. One aspect of this 
line of thinking could be found in the ideas of “managerial capitalism”. Berle and Means (by 
Gulbraith, 1970) were first drawing attention to the fact that managers are replacing the 
owners. James Burnham (1941/60) developed the first “convergence” theory in his book un­
der the title of “The Managerial Revolution”. For him in capitalism, as in communism, man­
agers are taking power from the hands of the capital owners in the first case and from the 
party bureaucracy in the second. The future is in the modern “rationally” organised society 
where the differences between communism and capitalism will disappear. Max Webers “iron 
cage” is realised through such managerial revolution. Burnham published his book in 1941 
and in essence his thesis underpinned all the modern theories of convergence. In those theo­
ries developed in the 1960s technological developments requiring “rational” management 
may have been more emphasised, but the essence was the same. Perhaps the theory most 
similar to Burnham’s was that exposed by J. K. Galbraith (1970), who developed the idea of 
the “technostructure” in his book “The New Industrial State”.
The expectations among convergence theory supporters“were even heightened with first 
economic reforms of the centrally planned communist economies (SSSR 19), in which some 
elements of the market regulation were introduced. The prevailing theoretical vision was,
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consequently, that the capitalist economy would become less and less market driven and 
more and more “rationally” planned by the new “managerial class”. At the same time, com­
munist economies would abandon rigid central planning and party control for more and 
more “rational” managerial control. It seems logical to expect that the liberal market econo­
mies will become “less” market driven. On the other side, centrally planned economies 
would become a little bit more market driven; based on the fact that in both cases the identi­
cal group would take control, we can expect the “convergence” of the two systems.
Although we can argue that all these theories were implicitly or explicitly predicting 
globalisation, none of them was correct in describing how that would happen. We will now 
analyse how globalisation started to prevail, and how it come to dominate the world econ­
omy.
The recent discussions of development and change are polarised around globalisation. 
One-group questions the notion of the existence of the globalised economy, while the other 
starts with assumption that globalisation already exists. The first take a stand that the world 
is far from the globalised economy. Hirsh and Thomson (1999) argue that globalisation is 
largely a myth because the present internationalised economy or trans-national economy is 
not the same as globalised economy. The contemporary economy is still not wholly open and 
integrated since most companies are based nationally; capital mobility is not producing a 
massive shift of investment and employment from advanced to developing countries. Ward 
(1996) stresses that managerial decisions and innovations are concentrated in home nations, 
and that further more around 88% of production is for domestic consumption. Trading and 
investment is mostly circulating between the most developed markets, with “third world” na­
tions left out of the process. Some economies have been successful in “catching up”, like the 
famous “Asian Tigers” but this could be taken more as an exception than the rule. According 
to the dependency theory we can always have some economies between “core” and “periph­
ery” which can succeed in finding their niche for development.
On the other hand we can find some arguments that support the existence of 
globalisation. Trading in foreign exchange per day in 1989 was, on average, 650 billions, but 
in late the 1990s, daily exchange was 1000 billions according to Holton. He goes on to say, 
“Capital investments and marketing are increasingly being conducted on a global scale in a 
range of interconnected and shifting locations according to transnational calculations of opti­
mal profitability.” (Holton, 1998. p. 52.). Finally, Wallerstein claims that the “globalisation 
represents the triumph of a capitalist world economy tied together by a global division of la­
bour.” (Wallerstein, I. 1984 in Holton, 1998).
In general, different branches of the social sciences stress different elements of 
globalisation. Economists define globalisation mainly as openness toward other countries, that 
no borders for investment flows, finance and transactions, trade and labour, and fewer regu­
lations for foreign inputs. Silbert and Klodt (1999) defined globalisation “as the process of 
converting separate national economies into an integrated world economy.” This conversion 
being achieved by international trade, international movement of factors of production (capi­
tal and workers) and international diffusion of technology.
Sociologists focus more on two groups of changes that indicate globalisation. Firstly, 
there are the structural changes: growing complexity of society, internal differentiation and 
acceleration of the speed of change. Secondly, there are new types of social relations on dis­
tance and the cultural dissemination and unification. Anthony Giddens defined globalisation 
as “the intensification of the worldwide social relations”, which links distant locations in such a 
way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away”, or in short “ac­
tion and distance”. (Leisink, 1999)
Political scientists are focused on three groups of issues. First, how democracy as a po­
litical phenomenon is influenced by globalisation as an economic phenomenon. Second, how
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dramatic changes in the role of nation-state are impacting on problems of sovereignty and 
autonomy. Third, the necessity of world governance and “how can civil society be constructed 
in an international arena?” (Barber, 1995).
From all of this we can conclude that although we are far from a real global economic 
system (Hirsh, Thompson 1999; Ward, 1996) there is a clear trend in that direction. Indeed, 
economy and technology together are pushing us toward more and more globalisation 
(Holton, 1998).
Causes of globalisation
Although we mentioned that globalisation is not a new process, it has become omni­
present in recent years. We will try to answer the question of what are the sources of this re­
cent (last 30 years) urge of globalisation? There are at least three dominant sources that are 
influencing that change; economy, ideology and technology.
The economies of the industrialised nations were, after the WWI and especially WWII, 
under the influence of the state politics aiming to balance the relations and reducing the ten­
sion between the capital and the workers (Trade Unions). Keynesian Welfare State means 
that the state is directly acting to correct socially undesirable effects of the free market. At 
the same time, the state has to secure the environment for economic growth and accumula­
tion. Those two functions become increasingly contradictory. From the 1930s, over the 
WWII to the 1970s the institutional development of the major developed economies was in 
the directions of the Keynsianism and welfare statism. Regulation of the economy, increased 
role of the state (reflected in the increased share of GDP in the hands of the state) charac­
terised the prevailing practices of the most developed economies. Although USA and other 
developed economies were pushing after WWII for increased openness of the world market, 
that did not directly influence the internal social arrangements of the welfare state. Of course 
there were big differences between economies. USA economy being the most open and rela­
tively “deregulated”, compared with Sweden and Germany on the other side of the spectrum. 
The last had very extensive state regulation, welfare protection and balance between the 
state, trade unions and the capital. Unprecedented growth in the post WWII period gave rise 
to hopes that Keynsianism is the final answer to the regulation of capitalist economy.
During the 1970s “Eurosclerosis” was the term increasingly used to describe the situa­
tion of the European welfare state slowing down of the growth instead of evolving into an ef­
ficient managerialism. The differences between more liberal traditions of US economy on 
one side and more closed and regulated European economies on the other become more and 
more obvious.
An additional factor was the successful development of the economies of the four Asian 
tigers and Japan. Although in all these countries the state played an important role, they suc­
ceeded in their development with strong elements of classical capitalism and openness to­
ward the world trade. It became obvious that the successful development of Asian tigers and 
Japan did not emulate the European Keynsian model.
In the 70s, some European countries faced market stagnation and budget deficit, show­
ing that the European model exhausted its adaptive capacity. The state budget was control­
ling larger and larger parts of GDP, and the welfare expenditure was “eating” large parts of 
the budget. The public sector was characterised by low productivity. Economic indicators 
were showing that countries with more economic flexibility, more openness toward other 
countries and lower spending on welfare were more efficient. But those indicators alone 
would not be sufficient to introduce change without strong ideological justification. Where 
did that ideological input come from and how did it become legitimate?
169
Šporer, 7..: Controversies of Globalisation Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXI. (2000), No 3-4: 165-181
Thatcherism and Reaganomics emerged as the alternative. Theoretical thinking of peo­
ple like Hayek and Milton Friedmann reemerged. In the period of the boom of Keynsian 
economics, these thinkers were regarded as some kind of “relics” of the XIX century liberal­
ism, more adequate for the museum of ideas than as an inspiration for practical policies.
The neo-liberal ideology started to prevail on two levels simultaneously. The first level 
started with Thatcher administration in GB and later under Regan administration in the US. 
It began with systematic privatisation of the state ownership. State employment started to 
shrink and was replaced with contractual jobs. Systematic change in regulation and 
re-regulations or deregulation occurred. Finally welfare or redestributive function of the 
state started to shrink (Pierson, 1996).
Second, on the global level, the IMF and the World Bank simultaneously began to im­
pose the same type of economic schemes for major reform on the countries that tried to bor­
row money. They called that “structural adjustment” (Farazmad, 1999). The main point was 
to impose massive privatisation and decline in public spending, removal of trade barriers and 
promotions of export orientations, deregulation at labour law and reduction of state inter­
vention in economy. All those regulations in the long run produced the same effect globally, 
imposing one universal model regardless of the local conditions.
Way did that type of ideological orientation not prevail earlier? Why did that happen 
right at that time in history?
The one possible reason why neo-liberal ideology started to dominate lies in the global 
relations between two dominant world powers and their ideologies, communism and capital­
ism. We should not forget that communism looked like a viable alternative for a very long pe­
riod from its emergence in Russia in 1917 until the first indicators of obvious decline become 
visible in late 60s. When the capitalist world was entering the great depression in the 1930s, 
the USSR was successfully implementing its five-year plans. Being on the victorious side in 
the WWII and successfully rebuilding the country gave the USSR internal legitimacy and 
high international credibility. The fact that it becomes world power, the military strength and 
the control of the Warsaw pact gave it a tremendous boost in international relations. Its 
model of state sponsored development was attractive for the majority of the third world lead­
ers and after the decolonisation they looked mostly to the USSR as a model to copy. It 
looked as though they had found the model allowing for the fastest possible transformation 
of the agricultural countries (which the former colonies mostly were) into the modern indus­
trial ones. USSR successes in the space race added to all this.
But from the sixties onwards, the growth was arrested and the Soviet system was under­
going constant change called economic reforms. Eastern European countries started to di­
verge in their institutional designs with Hungary and Poland being on the “reformist” side 
and Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (after 1968) and Rumania on the more “orthodox”. Yugo­
slavia was a special case with its “market socialism”. Why were these reforms undermining 
the attractiveness of communism and adding to the credibility of the neo-liberal ideology? 
The point was that communism exhausted the alternative solutions to the capitalist system. 
The reforms were all designed in a way to “import” a little bit of capitalism. Instead of offer­
ing an alternative to capitalism, or even, as envisioned by the “convergence” theorist, to be­
come more similar to capitalism but to add something of its own “originality”, the communist 
countries started to introduce more and more elements of the capitalist institutions. The 
market was called a “socialist” market, and experimentation with limited private property 
was abundant. More importantly, these countries became more and more dependent for 
their technological growth on the Western import of modern technology. It became obvious 
that the planned system was not able to produce innovation or to allow technological innova­
tions to spread. As a consequence, they started to open for trade with the capitalist econo­
mies in order to be able to import new technology. The classical example is Gierek’s Poland
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and its strategy of “opening up”. One of the results of this “opening up” was the catastrophe 
of the depth crisis. It was dubious from the beginning that these countries would be able to 
pay for the new technology with export unacceptable to the Western markets (that was not 
such a problem for USSR because of its energy and raw material richness). The changed 
conditions on the world credit market gave a final blow to the credibility of the communist 
economies.1
Even if we don’t go in the detailed analysis of the development in the sixties and seven­
ties, the ideological consequence of these developments was that communism stopped being 
an ideologically viable alternative. It did not have anything to offer on the “market of ideas”. 
Its reforms were more and more “creeping of capitalism from within”.
All components were there for the rise of neo-liberal ideology. The stagnation of the 
European welfare states, the success of the Asian Tigers and Japan, and the gradual loss of 
the attractiveness of the communist alternative made neo-liberal ideology more appealing 
and finally became supported among voters in GB and US. Hayek and Friedman were ele­
vated from the fringes of theoretical debates into its centre.
However the stage for the strong push toward globalisation would not be completed 
without the new technology. Information technology: computerisation, digitisation, satellite 
communications, transportation systems and finally the Internet, made globalisation possi­
ble. It opened the flow of information, it introduced tremendous speed in spreading informa­
tion, increased the efficiency of all sectors of production and made the world smaller. Eco­
nomically it boosted the production of new material and goods related to information tech­
nology and it invented untangle production of information technology (computer programs). 
Information technology made the globalisation process more visible, it has produced feeling 
that everything what happens fare away concerns us and influences us. Borderless feeling 
prevails over the classical closeness of nation-state. Trade, capital, finance is floating thought 
the Internet and the tendencies toward cultural unification as well.
To summarise the forces pushing toward globalisation, we can say that the first was 
gradual erosion of the communism as an alternative. This culminated in its final demise with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although we still have China officially as a communist country, we 
cannot argue that it presents any kind of alternative to the capitalist world. It is a mere “com­
munist shell” in the form of the authoritarian rule of the Party overseeing the transformation 
of the planned economy into the market economy. Nobody sees any “alternative” in the Chi­
nese model. The only alternative seen in China is the alternative path toward capitalism, with 
the Communist party maintaining control over society. This will presumably prevent a crash 
and the accompanying misery characterising the Russian transition. The misery and stagna­
tion characterising Cuba and North Korea speaks for itself, as regards the capability of these 
types of systems being able to offer a valid alternative to prevailing market economies and 
internationalisation of the world economies.
Second, the Keynesianism prevailing in the Western economies until early 70’s are chal­
lenged by the free market ideology. Successive application of the “free market” model of the 
Asian Tigers, neo-conservatism with economic liberalism in the USA shattered social demo-
1 Many within USSR (and communist dominated Europe) become aware of the problems. In the 
late 70's a group of Soviet scientist lead by influential physicist and academy members A. Sacharov publi­
shed open letter in LeMond addressed to the Soviet party leaders. They openly argued that the Soviet 
economy is losing the battle with the Western economy. It lagges behind in all sectors except in the pro­
ductions of row materials. Their main argument was that the omnipresent control and overregulation is 
strangling economic growth. The future economy will be based on the free and speedy information flows 
and the system with prevents this is doomed to fail.
Today's grappling of Chines government to control Internet is a repetition of the same story.
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cratic alternatives based on the Keynsian model. From Mitterand to Blair the socialist lead­
ers are advocates of the free market no less than “classical” conservatives. We could argue 
that the free market ideology became the only player on the “ideological field” with no real 
challenger. The attempts to formulate a “third way” are all based on the assumption of ac­
ceptance of the basis market postulates with only new ways of ameliorating its effects. In that 
sense we can speak about the “end of the ideology”, although the more precise description 
would be the victory of the market economy and democracy as a political system.
Alternatives to the market models are dead for now and the left is accommodating itself 
to the basic principles of the right. As the market ideology starts to be dominant, or eco­
nomic liberalism increasingly replaces the Keynesian model in the Western market econo­
mies. The former communist countries are trying fast to abandon their communist past and 
accept the market model as also majority of the “third World” countries abandoned their 
state controls for the more open liberal models. That can be observed from India to Uganda 
and from Malaysia to Brazil and Mexico.
New technologies allowed increased speed in communications so that multinational 
companies can operate on every inch of the globe. The disappearance of the political divi­
sions characterising the post WWII enabled capital to become truly global and circle the 
world.
We can ask, is globalisation only the triumph of capitalism now encompassing the whole 
world? Is it a new ideology developing to justify the triumph of one side in the Cold War? 
Can we expect that as capitalist development provoked the development of the labour move­
ment on the national levels in the nineteenth century, that global capitalism will provoke new 
anti-globalise movements on a global level in the twenty-first century?
We will briefly address those questions after reviewing consequences of the 
globalisation process.
Indicators and consequences of globalisation
When we are analyzing processes of social change, it is often very difficult to distinguish 
what is causing and what are the consequences of that process. In this part of our analysis we 
would like to find the main indicators of social change, which are often associated with 
globalisation. Most of those indicators are taken as measurement of globalisation. Our posi­
tion is that all of those indicators are globalisation itself and are at the same time reinforcing 
the globalisation process. We will start with the assumption that all the change that we re­
cently call globalisation, in politic and science is undergoing a process that causes different 
consequences on a regional, nation-state and global trans-national level. Starting with the 
functionalist assumption that every introduced change has intended and unintended conse­
quences, we would like to find out what are the economic, political and social consequences 
of the globalisation process.
Economic changes
The economic growth in large parts of the world in the last three decades was positive. 
In spite of the political turmoil following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and re­
cent Asian economic crises, the GDP growth 1974-1993 was impressive 7.5% for East Asia 
and 4.8% for South Asia with very meagre 2.0% and with 2.6% for Eastern Europe and for­
mer Soviet Union. The same rate of growth was achieved in the Latin America. Left out of 
this development are sub-Sahara Africa, Northern Africa and Middle East with average 
growth rate of 1.2%. (World Bank - The Economist, October 1, 1994) That should be com­
pared with the 2.9% rate of growth for the developing countries.
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If some parts of the world were so successful and others not, it is difficult to find one ex­
planatory factor, globalisation, as “guilty” for relative success of Asia and further deteriora­
tion of Sub-Sahara Africa. We can even argue the other way around that globalisation in gen­
eral has produced a decrease in differences for those who participated more in the process. 
On that basis we can argue that the key explanatory factor of the economic growth was the 
openness of the economy. So openness is one of the key globalisation indicators. Developing 
countries with open economies grew by 4.5% a year in the 1970s and 80s, but those with 
closed economies, grew by only 0.7% a year. The same difference can be seen between open 
and closed rich countries. Rich open economies grow by 2.3% and closed ones by 0.7% 
(Sachs-Wamer, The Economist, July 3, 1999). We can conclude from this that the more the 
country is included in globalisation process (measured by openness of its economy) the more 
successful was its economic development.
Foreign directed investments are those in manufacturing sector, factories, utilities, en­
ergy, telecommunications companies outside of the country in which the company is located. 
The data is showing that these investments are constantly growing and that the larger and 
larger parts of any domestic economy are opened up for such foreign investments and owner­
ship. Between 1982 and 1992, the value of outflows of direct investments from the OECD 
countries grew from 20 billion U.S. dollars to over 200 billions (Alderson, 1999).
Maybe the most dramatic recent example is telecommunications that are transformed 
from the state monopolies into the big internationally owned firms. Initial push to this devel­
opment was created by the technological development, which destroyed the “natural monop­
oly” of the industry. The reasons for the state running the telecommunication industry disap­
peared and the competitive market took it over. Combined with the tremendous speed of 
technological change this becomes one of the fastest growing industries in the modern econ­
omy.
The general idea of the dependency theory was that foreign investment would wreck the 
local economy. But the analysis does not confirm this projection. The general growth and the 
betterment of social and economic indicators are correlated with the presence of multina­
tional firms. Recently one analysis showed the benefits for labour of the increased presence 
of foreign firms. There are four facts that indicate such benefits. The first fact is that the for­
eign firms paid more then domestic ones. In US they paid 4% more in 1989 and they paid 
6% more in 1996. The second fact is that foreign firms are creating jobs faster then are their 
domestic counterpart. In US foreign firms create 1,4% new jobs compared with domestic
0,8%. Third, foreign firms spend heavily on research and development in the country where 
they invest. Fourth, foreign firms tend to export more then domestic one. (The Economist, 
January 8th, 2000) The same holds for developing countries. For example looking at Turkey 
we can find that foreign firm wages are 124% above the average and their workforce rise by 
11.5% per year compared with 0.6% for domestic firms etc. The foreign investments do not 
harm the economic prosperity of the developing countries. De Soysa and Oneal (1999) found 
that foreign direct investment stimulates investments from domestic sources. The global 
long-term trend does not prove any of the “catastrophic scenarios” which could happen to 
the developing countries quite the contrary.
International trade is higher then ever and is “growing twice as fast as the volume of 
world output.” (Siebert, Klodt, 1999) Rapid decline in the cost of transport and communica­
tion make international trade more affordable. Trade expansion created direct links of the la­
bour markets of developing and developed countries. There are many claims that imports 
from developing countries are directly responsible for the decline of manufacturing jobs in 
developed countries. Is that decline in manufacturing jobs solely the result of imports from 
developing countries or is it related with the “de-industrialisation” process and the rise of 
new technologies? Deindustrialisation had been predicted by social scientist a long time ago
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(eg., Clark, 1940). According to Alderson (1999) deindustrialisation would have happened in 
OECD countries anyway, even if the imports from developing countries had not occurred.
How much loss in employment we attribute to the technological growth and how much 
to the import of cheaper goods or export of manufacturing jobs into the developing countries 
depends on a different measurement. Unemployment is growing in the same segments of the 
labour force that are affected by deindustrialisation and technological change and at the 
same time by competition from countries with lower labour costs. (World Labour Report 
1997-98, ILO, 1997)
One the other side, a high number of new jobs has been created especially for the 
skilled workers in information technology and knowledge economy. Although we can see 
that the direct foreign investment is decreasing its demand for unskilled work in developed 
countries, this is offset by an increase in higher skilled jobs to supply component or services 
to affiliates abroad. Numerous studies in USA and Britain have confirmed that foreign in­
vestment is usually connected with exports back in the home country which will increase in 
general export of capital goods, marketing and design, as affiliates continue to buy technol­
ogy and knowledge-intensive components from the home country. The fact that the unem­
ployment in the most open economy of the USA is so low (4.1% nationaly) is the result of 
the globalisation and speaks against the argument that globalisation necessarily increases un­
employment in the home country. Economic growth offsets eventual loss of jobs due to 
globalisation processes and the loss will happen anyway as the result of the technological de­
velopment. The other side of the coin is that this foreign investment helps to increase em­
ployment in the developing countries.
The ideologies in developed countries are preaching about the free market but when it 
pinches them, they are also starting to cry against the globalisation. It is probably more im­
portant for the developed countries to foster structural changes which will allow them to use 
their comparative advantages. First they need to educate their labour force, close the old in­
dustries and try to curb investment into developing countries. That can help employment to 
rice in developing countries. Anyway, as data are showing, about half of foreign direct invest­
ment in developing countries is in mining and services and by definition the jobs created on 
such way are not directly taking the jobs from the developed job market (The Economist, Oc­
tober 1st, 1994)
The unemployment rate in developed countries like US are lower then ever at 4.1% in 
December 1999. In Europe it is higher and is probably more the result of the rigidity of the 
labour market (that explains the difference between Europe and USA) than by the 
globalisation as such. USA has a more open economy, having less labour regulations and less 
unemployment benefits.
Employment security becomes more doubtful for a number of reasons. First more and 
more jobs are becoming contractual. Contracting out and decreased unionisation of the la­
bour force is result of a deliberate managerial policy to cut labour costs. Trade unions in all 
OECD countries are losing power. They changed behaviour and tactics in order to copy the 
turbulence of the global market. They are not opposing relocation of the industry and they 
are supporting flexibility in organisation and employment conditions. (World Labour Report 
1997-98, ILO, 1997) As a result, the perception of uncertainty is becoming an everyday fea­
ture in individual life. “Many workers, in the North and South feel caught in a race to the 
bottom and believe that intensified global competition is exerting downward pressure on 
working conditions and labour standard.” (Somavia, 2000)
Parallel with economic growth and development, the wage gap between the rich and the 
poor is widening. This trend is visible on all levels. The gap between OECD countries and 
the poor developing countries is becoming bigger and bigger. On the national level, increas­
ing inequality and the polarisation of wages and salaries is growing. Many social scientists ex­
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plain that trend with sets of reasons that are linked together like a labour force shift, educa­
tional level, the new information technology and change in organisational behavior. As soci­
ety develops the large proportion of labour force shift from traditional lower paid job (agri­
culture, manufacturing) to a modern, better-paid job (services knowledge economy). In the 
last few decades, the labour forces shift (as we explained in the deindustrialisation process) 
from manufacturing to services and knowledge economy. Explanations for the developed 
countries can be that the demand for the highly skilled labour in the modern knowledge 
economy is increasingly rising, and parallel with that is the fall in demand for the unskilled 
labour. If the supply of educated people is not following this shift in demand, the wage gap 
will result. Those not equipped to compete on the labour market (mostly unskilled) are left 
out, and those who can participate successfully are better off. Fall of demand for the un­
skilled workers is the result of the technological development. With more opening and fur­
ther technological development and creation of knowledge economy, the need for the un­
skilled will further decline and that will reflect in the wider income gaps. The remedy and the 
long-term policy goal should be to increase the level of knowledge or alternatively, to close 
economy off for the competition from the developing countries. The comparative advantage 
of the developed countries is technology and knowledge rather than muscle and force. The 
surplus of muscles should be replaced by the increase in knowledge which, is probably the 
most important long-range goal of public policy for the future.
“Companies which make a lot of use of information technology also tend to employ 
more educated workers, to invest more in their training, to give line workers more responsi­
bilities and to allow more decentralised management. They used information technology to 
monitor employees more closely and to give them more freedom to make decisions.” (The 
Economist, May 8th, 1999.) Differences in wages are due to all of these factors within the 
companies and consequently among the companies. As a flexibility of the market grows the 
more inequality lies ahead.
How the wage gap is operating in the most developed economy and how even full em­
ployment does not mean that the workers are getting a “decent wage” can be shown on one 
recent example from the Fairfax county in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area. Fairfax is 
among the richest counties that has the highest median household income in the USA show­
ing that in the same time when unemployment rate in that county is dropping to 1.4% in De­
cember 1999, the number of homeless people is growing. (The Washington Post, March 14, 
2000.) That shows that employment as important indicator of economic grows as it is, would 
not necessary secure decent living conditions for all.
The economic consequences associated with globalisation seem controversial. Growing 
income inequalities and widening the wage gap, but at the same time there is dramatic drop 
in the number of people living in poverty in the developing countries. (A.T. Kearney, 2000) 
Going back into the history we can observe the same pattern. Taking as example the develop­
ment in the industrial revolution where in the beginning of industrialisation process the wage 
gap was also growing and later these differences were equalised. In the same way we can ex­
pect that after the initial stage of the revolutionising the process of production that we are 
witnessing now, the existing gaps will start to decline.
Political changes
The word is becoming obviously one (global) in the sense that crises are spreading from 
one place to another. Although that is also nothing completely new (we should remember 
great depression of 1929) but the causes and speed is of the new quality. Global political and 
economical cooperation is visible in the recent “Asian crisis” in 1997. That crisis was felt in 
Russia, Russian crisis in Latin America and the whole world was tottering. The FED acted as
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the world stabiliser and the American growth acted as an engine pulling the rest of the world 
out of the crisis. The globalisation was really felt on every part of the globe (better to say in 
every stock market around the world) and concerned world leader, led by Alan Greenspan 
and James Rubin tried to act in a way to pool economies of the world together.
The speed and availability of the capital contributed to the growth of the open econo­
mies but at the same time it contributed to the volatility of the particular economies and the 
world economy as the whole. Can we have the benefits of the free circulation of the capital 
without the negative effects and volatility? Different policy makers drew different conclu­
sions. Mahatir (Malyasian MP) was lamenting the world conspiracy and was trying to find the 
ways out of the crisis by increasing the barriers to speed and capability of capital, to move in 
and out of the particular market. Others were trying to find solutions in opening their mar­
kets even further. Thanks to the American overhaul, both strategies worked and those coun­
tries were pulled out of the crisis. But in spite of it the need for the new “financial architec­
ture” is discussed more and more. This can be taken as an indicator of the globalisation be­
cause the new global rules going beyond the existing ones are needed to cope with the speed 
and circulation of the global capital.
Political consequences focus on government of the nation-state. How do the new global 
environment and associated forces, which operate in an international context, change the be­
haviour and role of the government in relation to economy, law and regulations, cooperation, 
authority and sovereignty? The process of internationalisation and deregulation of capital, 
market and labour undermine the authority of the nation-state intervention (Pierson, 1996). 
The trans-national economic forces threaten economic power of the nation-state. The 
globalisation process decreases the capability of the state to maintain its welfare function. 
Under international competition, the states that maintain generous welfare policies impose 
burden on its industry and decrease its competitiveness. The government role is now to make 
national environment more attractive for business and capital investment. First, most of the 
governments concentrate on finding their own comparative advantage in the global division 
of labour and to support the type of development based on that advantage. In order to at­
tract investment, they usually make transparent and internationally compatible rules and reg­
ulations, developed local transportation, infrastructure, communications, and appropriately 
skilled labour force. (Leisink, 1999). From a welfare state with its concentration of power, 
because that state was owner, employer, regulator and redistributor, government shifts to­
ward a corporate state. The same process that led governments into competition for invest­
ment on the global market put them into position to go to reduce the welfare benefits in or­
der to reduce business costs and to attract investment and make domestic production 
cheaper. Some authors call that the “race to the bottom”.
“Globalisation is dissolving the essential structure of modern statehood” (Pierson, 1996, 
p. 192) Governments are pushed into the direction of more and more cooperation and inter­
dependence with other states globally, accepting international laws and regulations in the ar­
eas related to human rights and environmental protection. We can argue that cooperation is 
replacing unilateral exercise of power. Cooperation among nations-states is the growing pro­
cess in which societies are becoming more dependent on each other because the problems 
that they have to deal with are more complex and interdependent. Interdependency or using 
Durkheim terminology “organic solidarity” is inevitable it is moving from the regional and 
national level to the international and global. As a consequence, states are obviously losing 
part of their authority and autonomy.
The nation-state is still the mediator between local level and global level and that role is 
going to be more and more important in the future. Nation-states will still control and im­
pose law and order on its territory but more and more rules and regulations are going to be 
multilateral. Global institutions are going to intervene in state affairs more often to impose
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global standards. That is going to be a driving force for institutional change in the future. 
(One of the recent examples is a mandatory sentencing that is in place in NT and WA. The 
role of Australian federal government was to introduce the change under the pressure from 
the UN Commission for human rights.)
Social implications
Globalisation produces business alliances across borders, spread the innovations and 
technology and develops new types of distant social relations. New information technology 
and cheap transport and communication make all those relations on distance easy and possi­
ble. The spread of all types of information around the world makes a world smaller in indi­
vidual perception and also raises the human aspirations. If these new aspirations cannot be 
fulfilled, we have tensions and frustration as a consequence. It is, for example, very difficult 
to envision that Chinese can achieve American standards of living without producing serious 
imbalances of resources and productive capabilities presently existing. With globalisation, as­
pirations for achieving that standard of living are probably growing much faster than the ca­
pabilities of their fulfilment. We can predict that this gap will produce an increased level of 
tensions and strains.
The globalisation process, combined with the phenomenon of “greying” of the most ad­
vanced societies are producing some new interesting phenomena. In the “greying” societies a 
young working force is in demand. On the other side the globalisation is spreading universal 
values and the majority wants to imitate the Western standards of living. Generally people 
are becoming more familiar with the main cultural characteristics of the Western countries. 
Both trends act as a strong “pull factor” for immigration. Increased immigration into devel­
oped countries is growing as well because of “push factors” like low economic standards and 
political insecurity in the developing countries.
The contradiction is that immigration becomes more attractive and culturally more ac­
ceptable and easy but at the same time new communication technology can slow down the 
assimilation processes. The communication with the homeland is becoming more intense 
than before (from Internet to cheaper air tickets). The immigrants will stand longer with 
“one leg” in their homeland than in the situation when the immigration meant total discon­
nection with the homeland. In that way we have a dialectical contradiction - on the one 
hand, more widespread acceptance of Western values through globalisation process, but on 
the other more open channels for keeping traditional values even in the places very distant 
from the homeland. The consequence is increased heterogeneity. Immigration under the 
“new conditions” makes assimilation slower than before.
Building identity is the essential process in personal growing and it is related to groups, 
organisations, associations and the territory where a person lives. Identity is a social construc­
tion and “use building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive 
and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and personal fantasies, from power ap­
paratuses and religious revelations.’’(Castells, 1997) While the people are more often belong­
ing to a different groups due to the prolonged schooling, working in different organizations, 
belonging to different associations, moving to different territory and participating in global 
trends, they are developing a multiple identity (Albrow, 2000). The rise of network society is a 
new dimension that influences the process of constructing identity. This multiple identity and 
shift from national-state identity to global identity is the undergoing process and it imposes 
completely new requirements for government and politics in the future.
Finally, the question of community and social cohesion in a globalised world is often 
raised as an important issue. How does globalisation affect the community? Does globali­
sation reinforce a community (gemeinschaft) in which most people know each other or are
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we going to have society in which most people are strangers to one another (gesellschaft). 
The recant research (Hampton, K., B. Wellman, 2000) findings show that the Internet en­
courages greater community involvement, and relationships on distance. The new technol­
ogy, which is the integral part of the globalisation, improves local communication and 
strengthens local relationships with neighbours and produce community bounds. It strength­
ens communication on distance and helps maintain social relations among friends and rela­
tives. Hampton and Wellman (2000) name this improve combination of global and local ac­
tivities as “glocalization”. The other important consequences are that Internet can encourage 
and promote civil involvement on the local level as well as on global.
The community and society is not limited by the state boundaries but it is more and more 
global. Thanks to information technology more and more people are going to be aware of and 
participate in events that are happening far away. Consequently they will make judgments 
about global issues which are prerequisite for global civil society. On the other hand they will 
also urge the need to protect regional specificity and we will find more and more movements 
in both directions; toward globalisation and at the same time toward regionalisation.
“Left” and “right” together again
The structural change, which is occurring in the world economy, society and technology, 
divides people in the interpretation and evaluation of the globalisation process. The groups 
that are gaining or can easily cope with change in general support it. On the other side the 
groups that are losing and are not capable of dealing with undergoing change are against it.
Are there any social groups that are totally left out of the new “prosperity”? In indus­
trialised countries the welfare recipient that developed welfare dependency are obviously the 
first group of losers. The unskilled and semi-skilled workers in manufacturing industries ex­
posed to global competition, is the second group that might be left out of prosperity. Trade 
Unions who used to defend workers rights are gradually losing power. If these groups are 
permanently left out and are transformed into permanent losers, than we can expect in­
creased social tensions. This is usually the argument and the urge for protection by the “left­
ist” part of the political spectrum.
The other sorts of tensions can come from the changing role of the nation-state and the 
perceived threat to its autonomy and sovereignty. It can provoke and animate all types of na­
tionalistic feelings, and become the basis of movement creation in a “rightist” direction. The 
forces of traditional nationalism are woken up and are fuelled by the homogenising pro­
cesses accompanying globalisation. In that way globalisation becomes the ideological enemy 
advocated by differently oriented groups.
The other forms of resistance come from the people developing high cultural sensitivi­
ties against a new global, “McWorld” (Barber, 1996) culture. Those “cultural advocates” 
who, in the name of protecting cultural and “some social values which were once perfectly 
functional, have been transformed for the worst by the ascendant ethos of individualism and 
competitiveness.” (Somavia, 2000) This is nothing new. Every modernisation creates groups 
of people who are defending “traditional” values against, “new” values, “imported” values 
etc. Economic modernization was destroying old forms of social life and imposing a new one. 
The modern sociology was created exactly from this contradiction. Concepts such as 
“gemeinschaft” and “gessellschaft” (Ferdinand Tonnies), “mechanic” and “organic” solidar­
ity (Emile Durkheim) was reflected this contradiction. In the same way the globalisation pro­
cesses are on the one hand incorporating cultures into the new global one, and destroying 
the variety of existing forms. The dilemma is if the globalisation means destruction of the old 
cultures and with it of a variety of existing cultures, then maybe it creates new possibilities of 
preservation?
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Globalisation also creates counter processes like regionalisation. While globalisation 
become more and more obvious in everyday life, people try to protect their regional specific­
ity. They also feel threatened about how that process is going to affect them and about their 
position in the global world.
Sometimes in paradoxical ways, globalisation provokes or enables regional fusion. The 
separatist forces in former communist countries were acting in the name of the new integra­
tion. When Baltic countries succeeded from the USSR, or Slovenia and Croatia from Yugo­
slavia, they were doing it in the name of creating preconditions for integration with Europe. 
(Sekulic, 1998) The similar paradox is that the “devolution” in Britain is made possible, ac­
cording to many observers, exactly by the increased European integrations. The concept of 
“Europe of region” is born as a way of new integration by-passing the nation-state as the in­
termediary between the local and the global.
As the result of these tensions we can expect new ideological configurations. The “new 
alliance of left and right” can be formed. The left can mobilise its classical support among the 
workers and among those who are losing in this new process of economic change. The right 
can also mobilise against the loss of “national sovereignty” and “cultural identity”. From Pat 
Buchanan to classical nationalist right in Europe, the danger of a “shift of decision making” 
to supranational bodies imagined or real, can help to mobilise these strange bedfellows into 
the struggle against the common enemy.
To this alliance we should also add the new “post-material oriented” (Inglehart, 1995) 
middle classes in the developed world. They are defending “post-materialistic values”, “qual­
ity of life” against the growth oriented classical capitalism. Through these they can also enter 
into alliances with traditional left against the capitalist growth. At the same time they are 
against the main interests of developing countries interested in growth. To use the analogy 
from Maslow theory, the post-materialistic values are developing only after materialistic as­
pirations are satisfied. We cannot expect that those who did not satisfy their materialistic val­
ues will share the same post-materialistic values. Those driving their car to the meeting of the 
“Sierra club” and preaching the conservation are not having the same perspective as those 
using the muscles of their feet as their only means of transportation and whose main preoc­
cupation is day to day survival.
Finally, economic growth and globalisation are bringing the environmental issue on the 
table. On one side globalisation gives us a chance to know more about environmental degra­
dation and destruction all over the world. On the other hand people are more ready to op­
pose development and economic growth in some regions far away because they do want to 
protect the environment. Almost everybody agrees that the Amazon forest has to be pro­
tected from further devastation but do we have a right to prevent poor people to farm in that 
area? That is another possible line of conflict that can split support for globalisation.
We can conclude that people will oppose globalisation based on different motifs. Those 
left out of development will oppose globalisation based on their materialist interest, while the 
modern Western middle classes developing “post-materialist” interest will join them opposing 
globalisation because of the post-materialistic values and concerns. They will join forces with 
resurgent traditional forces of nationalism and state sovereignty. Together they will and are 
forming a new alliance struggling against economic development based on the new global 
forces. That shows that globalisation will become the key ideological issue of the future.
Conclusion
Globalisation is a continual process of social change, which occurs at different speeds. 
The global political constellation and ideological orientations, which prevail in some period 
of history, support the globalisation process and affect the speed. In the last 30 years, politi-
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cal change and ideological orientations, especially combined with tremendous development 
in information technology, accelerate globalisation and cause it to become more visible then 
ever before.
Like every social change, globalisation produces a number of controversial conse­
quences. On one hand, positive economic growth combined with constantly growing foreign 
investments and higher international trade are the main characteristics of the global econ­
omy. At the same time this produces a growing inequality and widening of the wage gap in 
developed societies while on the other hand, in developing countries, there is dramatic drop 
in the number of people living in poverty.
Who is in charge the nation-states or multinational corporations during all those dramatic 
changes, is the dominant issue related to the growing speed of globalisation. The role of gov­
ernment of the nation-state changes in relation to the economy, law and regulations, autonomy 
and sovereignty. The need for global government, global regulations and cooperation is grow­
ing and institutional changes of the nation-state as well as at a global level will occur.
Globalisation influences the rise of human aspirations on a personal level, increases im­
migration and heterogeneity within a society while people develop a multiple identity. What 
is probably more interesting is that globalisation, because of multiple and very different con­
sequences in every sphere of human life, divides people in their interpretation, evaluation 
and support for the globalisation process. So groups with very different ideological orienta­
tions form some kind of unconscious alliance against globalisation. Hence some kind of so­
cial movement against globalisation is in the air. Would this slow down the speed of 
globalisation and impose new barriers and political obstacles, or would the fast globalisation 
trend prevail? This is an open question.
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GLOBALIZACUSKE KONTROVERZE
ŽELJKA ŠPORER
University of South Australia
Globalizacija je posljednji stadij u stalnom procesu društvene promjene 
koja je započela industrijalizacijom i modernizacijom u Europi ali se sada 
globalno širi. Članak analizira različite teorije globalizacije i kako se novi val 
globalizacije (u posljednjih 30 godina) odnosi prema povijesnim događajima 
koji su prouzročili promjene u ekonomiji, ideologiji i tehnologiji.
Globalizacija je definirana kao proces pretvranja odvojenih nacional­
nih ekonomija u integriranu svjetsku ekonomiju; u području društvene sfere 
očituje se kao pojačavanje društvenih odnosa na daljinu, a u području javno­
sti kao gubitak moći i autoriteta država-nacija. Polazeći od te definicije veći 
dio članka je posvećen analiziranju ekonomskih, društvenih i političkih indi­
katora, i posljedica globalizacije. Kao termin i kao proces koji traje globaliza­
cija postaje široko prepoznata, a ljudi s uglavnom različitim ideološkim pogle­
dima počinju stvarati novi “čudan ” savez protiv globalizacije.
Ključne riječi: GLOBALIZACIJA, DRUŠTVENA PROMJENA, DRU­
ŠTVENI POKRETI.
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